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COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERM
TAX EXEMPTION ALLOWED FOR PORTION OF HOSPITAL PREMISES SUPPLIED TO
HOSPITAL PERSONNEL
St. Lukes, a hospital located in New York City derives about seventy-five
per cent of its annual revenue from fees paid by patients. Only capital invest-
ments and annual deficits are met by voluntary charity. St. Lukes also owns
and rents ten apartment buildings, situated in the immediate vicinity of the
hospital, which provide additional revenue. The apartments are rented to
hospital personnel, as well as outsiders. St. Lukes brought a petition claiming
a tax exemption on this realty under New York Law section 4(6) and New
York Real Property Tax Law section 420(1), (2) and (5). Petitioner alleged
that it was a "free public hospital," since patients were admitted without
discrimination. It was further alleged that these apartments were being used
for hospital purposes because: (1) all income therefrom was applied exclusively
to the maintenance of the institution; and (2) the apartments were rented
exclusively to hospital personnel as they became vacated by other tenants.
Held, (1) St. Lukes was not a "free public hospital" but merely a hospital, as
defined in the statute; but (2) supplying of living accomodations for hospital
personnel and their immediate families was a hospital purpose entitling St. Lukes
to tax exemptions for the portions occupied by such personnel. Saint Lukes Hosp.
v. Boyland, 12 N.Y.2d 135, 187 N.E.2d 769, 237 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1962).
The traditional justification for tax exemptions for charitable organizations
is that these organizations perform functions and render services which relieve
the state of financial burden. For example, where the activities of an organiza-
tion tend to decrease disorder, and thus conserve the time of the police
force, tax exemptions are allowed because the State is directly benefited., The
organization's activities are said to compensate for any financial loss the State
may incur in allowing an exemption. Justification for these exemptions extends
beyond mere monetary considerations. Where the State has a distinct interest
in the care and maintenance of a certain class of citizens, exemptions are granted
even though the State, itself, has no specific duty to render these services, on
the theory that the organization is performing a public welfare function.2 Ex-
emptions are also based on the theory that charitable organizations perform
services that are so important to society that such treatment is justified. 3 It
can be readily seen that an organization which: (1) relieves the State of a
specific function; (2) serves society at large, or selected portions of the public-
at-large in a welfare capacity; or (3) engages in an activity of great importance
to society so as to justify exemption will be exempt since it becomes quasi-
public in character. To constitute a public charity an organization must confer
1. National Navy Club v. New York, 122 Misc. 89, 92, 203 N.Y. Supp. 114, 117 (Sup.
Ct. 1923).
2. Webster Apartments v. New York, 118 Misc. 91, 93, 193 N.Y. Supp. 650, 651 (Sup.
Ct. 1922).
3. People ex reJ. Near East Foundation v. Boyland, 201 Misc. 855, 858, 106 N.Y.S.2d
736, 740 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
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benefits on indefinite persons (i.e., a class of persons). 4 It is then public in
nature even though its benefits are extended to members of a specific organiza-
tion. But where certain and defined individuals are served the organization is
private and taxable. While it has been maintained that these statutory exemp-
tions are a function of the administrative policy of the State, and not a funda-
mental right based on the organization's public character, it is not the function
of an administrative officer to determine where the line shall be drawn which
divides the field subject to taxation from the field where no tax has been
imposed.6 This is primarily a legislative function, and the right to these exemp-
tions is "fundamental" in the sense that the legislative policy vindicating them
can be traced back for one hundred seventy-five years.7 The statutory basis for
these exemptions is contained in the New York Real Property Tax Law section
420 which provides that "real property owned by a corporation or association
organized exclusively for the moral or mental improvement of men and women,
or for . . . charitable [or] benevolent . . . purposes . . . shall be exempt from
taxation. . . ." The test of charitable purpose is factual as determined from
the statutory provisions; and is applied to the purposes of the organization as
enumerated in the corporate charter.8 Under this test institutions organized for
private profit are not within the statute. Trusts created to form charitable cor-
porations are within the statute, except where the trustee has the power to donate
trust money to private institutions or power to hold the proceeds for an in-
dividual.' 0 The statute encompasses many varied organizations," in addition
to such standard charitable organizations as religious groups and hospitals.12
Even unorthodox organizations whose methods are not generally accepted in
their field may be included.13 Further, these corporations must be organized
4. Cornell University v. Thorne, 184 Misc. 630, 635, 57 N.Y.S.2d 6, 11 (Sup. Ct.
1945).
5. Application of Thomas S. Clarkson Memorial College of Technology, 274 App. Div.
732, 87 N.Y.S.2d 491 (3d Dep't 1949), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 595, 89 N.E.2d 882 (1949).
6. Good Humor Corp. v. McGoldrick, 289 N.Y. 452, 455, 46 N.E.2d 881, 882 (1943).
7. L. 1779 ch. 21, as republished by L. 1885 ch. 341; Vol. 1, 185, 190 (Weed Parsons
and Co. Albany, 1886).
8. People ex rel. Untermeyer v. McGregor, 295 N.Y. 237, 66 N.E.2d 292 (1946).
9. People ex rel. Bank For Savings in City of New York v. Miller, 84 App. Div. 168,
82 N.Y. Supp. 621 (3d Dep't 1903).
10. Butterworth v. Keeler, 219 N.Y. 446, 114 N.E. 803 (1916); Matter of Shattuck,
193 N.Y. 446, 86 N.E. 455 (1908); In re Graves, 34 Misc. 677, 70 N.Y. Supp. 727 (Surr.
Ct. 1901); Op. Att'y Gen. 595 (1913).
11. People ex rel. Thomas S. Clarkson Memorial College v. Haggett, 300 N.Y. 595,
89 N.E.2d 882 (1949); People ex rel. Trustees of Masonic Hall and Asylum Fund v.
Miller, 279 N.Y. 137, 18 N.E.2d 8 (1938); People ex rel. Bleakley v. Sexton, 265 N.Y.
480, 193 N.E. 280 (1934); Matter of Watson, 171 N.Y. 256; 63 N.E. 1109 (1902);
People ex rel. Andrews v. Cameron, 140 App. Div. 76, 124 N.Y. Supp. 949 (3d Dep't 1910),
aff'd, 200 N.Y. 585, 94 N.E. 1097 (1911); People ex rel. Pierpont Morgan Library v.
Miller, 177 Misc. 144, 29 N.Y.S.2d 445 (Sup. Ct. 1941); National Navy Club v. New York,
122 Misc. 89, 203 N.Y. Supp. 114 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Webster Apartments v. New York,
118 Misc. 91, 193 N.Y. Supp. 650 (Sup. Ct. 1922). Op. Att'y Gen. 395 (1905).
12. People ex rel. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society Inc. v. Haring, 8 N.Y.2d
350, 170 N.E.2d 677, 207 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1960); People ex rel. Doctors Hospital v. Sexton,
267 App. Div. 736, 48 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1st Dep't 1944).
13. People v. Haring, supra note 12; People ex rel. Johnson O'Connor Research
Foundation v. Tax Comm'rs, City of New York, 96 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
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and existing under New York law,14 although their activities need not be
confined to New York.15 The right to an exemption is determined on July 1st
each year and property exempt on that date is exempt for the subsequent year
even though ownership is transferred to one not entitled to an exemption.
16
Once it has been established that a corporation is an organization within
the statute, the organization must also show that the property is, in fact, being
used for a corporate purpose. This test is based upon the facts surrounding the
usage of the property. Exemptions are accorded for property usages which are
necessary and incidental functions of the particular organization. Exemptions
are not accorded for collateral activities' 7 except where these activities are vital
to the fulfillment of corporate purposes. The necessary function requirement is
ignored when non-income producing property is not in actual use, provided im-
provements to fulfill such a function are in good faith contemplated, or in
progress.' 8 In cases where ninety-five per cent of the property is used for a
necessary function, the courts won't quibble about the extra five per cent which
provides a collateral source of revenue. 19 Where the State will provide the same
service free, a property use in lieu of this service, is deemed unnecessary.
20
Use of organization property as residences for officials is deemed not
necessary in the case of religious groups, especially where the residence is larger
than the church.21 Residences provided for organization members are exempt,
but when non-members are allowed the use of the same facilities, the courts
deem this a collateral usage and the property is taxed.22 Educational institutions
are allowed exemptions for faculty residences situated on the campus proper
or separate, even when the residences are occupied by a professor's family, or
by retired professors. 23 Residences for hospital personnel are accorded the same
14. Hunter College Student Social Community and Religious Clubs Association v.
City of New York, 63 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
15. People ex rel. Near East Foundation v. Boyland, 201 Misc. 855, 106 N.Y.S.2d
736 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
16. 5 Op. N.Y. State Compt. 334 (1949).
17. People ex rel. Unity Congregational Society of N.Y. v. Mills, 189 Misc. 774,
71 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct. 1947); People ex rel. Sisters of Mercy v. Nowles, 34 Misc.
501, 70 N.Y. Supp. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1901); Matter of Albany Memorial Hosp., 34 N.Y. St.
Dep't 25 (1934).
18. Board of Foreign Missions v. Board of Assessors, 244 N.Y. 42, 154 N.E. 816
(1926); see also Matter of Mary Immaculate School, 188 App. Div. 5, 175 N.Y. Supp. 701
(2d Dep't 1919).
19. People ex rel. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society Inc. v. Haring, 8 N.Y.2d 350,
170 N.E.2d 677, 207 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1960).
20. N.Y. Catholic Protectory v. City of N.Y., 175 Misc. 427, 23 N.Y.S.2d 789
(Sup. Ct. 1940).
21. People ex rel. Society of the Free Church v. Feitner, 168 N.Y. 494, 61 N.E. 762
(1901); Congregation Gedulath Mordecai v. New York, 135 Misc. 823, 238 N.Y. Supp.
525 (Munic. Ct. N.Y.C. 1929).
22. People ex rel. Young Men's Association for Mutual Improvement in the City of
Albany v. Sayles, 32 App. Div. 197, 53 N.Y. Supp. 67 (3d Dep't 1898), aff'd, 157 N.Y.
677, 51 N.E. 1093 (1898); Y.W.C-A. v. New York, 137 Misc. 321, 243 N.Y. Supp. 294
(Sup. Ct. 1928).
23. People ex rel. Thomas S. Clarkson Memorial College v. Haggett, 300 N.Y. 595,
89 N.E.2d 882 (1949); Matter of Pratt Institute v. Boyland, 16 Misc. 2d 58, 174
N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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liberal treatment.2 4 In the case of education and hospital organizations as
opposed to religious groups, the courts are more liable to allow exemption for
necessity, since in the former, personnel within the organization are more numer-
ous, than in the latter where few personnel operate the entire organization. In
effect, in the case of residences, whether property is being used for a necessary
corporate purpose depends on: (1) the size of the organization; (2) the number
of personnel and officials within the organization; (3) the number of members;
(4) whether the organization requires nearby residences; and (5) whether near-
by residences are actually available.
The reasoning in the instant case may be divided into two key portions.
First the Court reasoned that the present day relevant Tax Law sections are
substantially the same as the original Tax Law passed in 1896. Therefore, to
define a "free public hospital," conditions as they existed in 1896 must be
examined. Cases decided under the original statute held that a "free public
hospital" was one which: (1) received no financial aid from New York;
(2) provided gratuitous treatment exclusively; and (3) was maintained by
voluntary charity. 25 The financial structure of St. Lukes showed that: (1) only
capital investments and annual deficits were financed through voluntary charity;
and (2) seventy-five per cent of the hospital's revenue was derived from fees
charged to patients. The Court then concluded that St. Lukes was not a
free public hospital because it charged its patients. St. Lukes Hospital failed
to meet the last two of these qualifications, particularly that of providing
free care and thus is not a "free public hospital." The test of a hospital purpose
is whether it is reasonably incident to the major purpose of the institution. The
court refers to a relevant case which held that the supplying of living accomoda-
tions for hospital personnel is hospital purpose. In that case, the court took
judicial notice of the fact that this practice is customary and necessary to
prevent a rapid turnover of nurses and technicians.2 0 The court then alludes
to the fact that it is normal to allow tax exemptions for residences provided
for educational personnel and their families 2 7 Payment of rent by personnel
is not relevant. Nor is it important whether the buildings are separate or con-
tiguous to the hospital.2 8 Real Property Tax Law section 422 (which provides
24. Matter of DeMott v. Notey, 3 N.Y.2d 116, 143 N.E.2d 804, 164 N.Y.S.2d 398
(1957).
25. Matter of Montefiore Home v. Prendergast, 159 App. Div. 644, 144 N.Y. Supp.
953 (1st Dep't 1913), aff'd, 211 N.Y. 549, 165 N.E. 1090 (1914); Western Dispensary
of N.Y. City v. Mayor of New York, 24 Jones & S. 361 (Super. Ct. N.Y.C. 1889).
26. Matter of DeMott v. Notey, 3 N.Y.2d 116, 143 N.E.2d 804, 164 N.Y.S.2d 398
(1957).
27. Matter of New York University v. Temporary State Housing Rent Comm'n, 304
N.Y. 124, 106 N.E.2d 44 (1952); People ex rel. Thomas S. Clarkson Memorial College v.
Haggett, 300 N.Y. 595, 89 N.E.2d 882 (1949); Matter of Pratt Institute v. Boyland,
16 Misc. 2d 58, 174 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
28. See People ex rel. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society Inc. v" Haring, 8 N.Y.2d
350, 170 N.E.2d 677, 207 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1961); Matter of Syracuse University, 124 Misc.
788, 209 N.Y. Supp. 329 (Sup. Ct. 1925) ; People ex rel. N.Y. Hosp. v. Purdy, 58 Hun 386, 12
N.Y. Supp. 307 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
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for similar exemptions in a case where a corporation is formed specifically for
providing residential facilities for these types of organizations) does not pre-
clude an exemption under the statute in question and failure to claim these
exemptions in prior years does not estop St. Lukes from a later claim for
exemption.29 On these bases, the court ultimately concludes that supplying living
accommodations to hospital personnel and their families is a purpose reasonably
incident to the major purpose of the hospital entitling St. Lukes to partial exemp-
tion.
The most important aspect of the instant case is the decision that a "free
hospital" is one that does not charge for its services. The statute states that a
"free public hospital" is entitled to property exemptions even though portions
are used for non-hospital purposes, provided the income is applied to the sup-
port of the hospital. Today in New York there are few if any hospitals which
do not charge for their services. Most hospitals charge at cost or, even above
cost as in the case of private patients. As a result of this case, today's hospitals
must be labeled as merely hospitals "within the statute." This means that they
are only entitled to exemptions on property actually used for hospital purposes.
The instant case has figuratively eliminated the words "free public hospital"
from the statute. The elimination of the special exemption for free public
hospitals, places hospitals in the same category as other charitable organizations
under the statute. In the early ninteenth and twentieth centuries, hospitals were
private enterprises and needed these special exemptions because they had no
means of support except charitable contributions and many patients could not
afford medical care. These conditions are not prevalent today. In many cases,
state and local authorities provide financial support for these organizations. The
development of social and public concern for these institutions has, in part
eliminated the pressing need for private funds. Medical insurance plans, such
as Blue Cross and Blue Shield, make it easier for patients to pay medical ex-
penses. Contemplated federal government medical care for the aged, should also
ease the patient's inability to pay. Thus the special exemption geared to the
needs of the nineteenth century, has become outmoded in the light of present
day social and insurance developments and has been justifiably eliminated.
Thomas M. Agate
TORTS
MAINTENANCE OF ABANDONED HOUSE IN STATE OF DISREPAIR NOT BASIS FOOR
ABSOLUTE LIABILITY
Infant plaintiff entered defendant's abandoned house to retrieve his base-
ball glove thrown through an open window by other boys, fell from an open
window and was injured. The house was scheduled for demolition and had been
29. See Cruger v. Dougherty, 43 N.Y. 107 (1870).
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